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The Employment Tribunal and the 
Employment Court 
John Hughes• 
In the controversy that has accompanied the introduction of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991, ,appreciation of the significant jurisdictional changes made by 
the legislation have understandably taken second place to the expression of w.ider 
concerns.. The ,aim of this not,e is to exa.mine aspec.ts of the new Employment 
Tribunal and Employment Court within the overall framework of the 1991 Act. At 
the time ofwrit.ing, the relevant Part of the 1991 Act has yet to come into force. 
I. The ~options paper 
When the Employment Contracts Bill was introduced into the House, the 
Governm~ent asked the Labour Select Committee to examine 3 "outstanding"' issues . 
These w~ere the application of the personal grievance procedur~es, the role of the Labour 
Court, and the role of the M~ediation Service (Minister of Labour, 1991). Four 
uinstitutional options" were pr~esented. First, that the Labour Court and Mediation 
Service be retained. Secondly, that there be a specialist lower ·tribunal with reten'ljon of 
the Labour Court. Thirdly., that there be a specialist lower tribunal with appellate rights 
to the High ~Court. Fourthly, that there be no provision for any specialist institutions. 
The adoption of the second option in the Employment Contracts Act 1991 follow·ed 
a recommendation by the Departm~ent of Labour to the Labour Select Committee, the 
Department commenting that 
This option offers the advantage of continuity at the higher level and the 
opportunity to design a tribunal at the lower level to meet the dispute resolution 
needs of the parties in the new environment. With the appropriate structure at 
the lower level, the option could provide an adequate, flexible, and 
comparatively inexpensive dispute resolution process for employment rnauers. 
This option also addresses the perceived difficulties in having one person both 
mediate and then potentially arbitrate over the same matter (Department of 
Labour, 1991). 
Given the partisan nature of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 it seems 
reasonable to suppose that the absence of any union submission expressing a preference 
for this option (Deparunent of Labour, 1991) would also have been perceived- in the 
"new environment" - as being in its favour. The following note will focus on the new 
Employment Tribunal, contrasting its role and functions with the role of those people 
chairing committees under the Labour Relations Act 1987, and the contrast between the 
role of the Employment ~Court and that of the Labour Court. Part VI of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991, which ~established the new institutions, com,es into force on 19 
August 1991. The Tribunal and the Court will have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and 
dctennine any proceedings founded on an employment contract, although the parties may 
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agree to have their differences .fesolved otherwise than by reference to a court or tribunal 
(s.3). The intention was to create a single employment law and jurisdiction (Department 
of Labour, 1991). 
The meaning of "founded on" on this context is obscure and will no doubt be tested 
in litigation in the near future. Would it, for instance, confer jurisdiction on the Court to 
restrain picketing which interfered with the perfonnance of a contract of employment? 
The tort of nuisance, the tort usually invoked in picketing cases, is not one of the listed 
torts over which the Court has jurisdiction, and .even then the jurisdiction is only for 
purposes of strikes or lockouts. Is there the jurisdiction for inducement of breach of 
contract outside the context of industrial action such as whefe employer A induces 
employees of employer B 10 break their contracts and join A's employ? Or for the tort of 
conversion by an employee of employer B in the last example if, as often happens in 
such cases, one or more of the departing employees takes employer B's files or computer 
records as an introductory gift for employer A)? It would not seem 10 be inconsistent 
with the general aim of creating a "single employment law" to remove such ancillary 
matters from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. Concurrent jurisdiction may seem 
unsatisfactory where related claims based upon the same set of facts must be pursued in 
different tribunals based upon the same set of facts, particularly when the choice of forum 
may affect significantly process and outcomes (Burrows, 1991). Yet the right of access 
to the ordinary courts would thereby be undercut without express statutory authority. 
Whether this is to be a significant aspect of the Act in certain respects remains to be 
seen. 
2. The Employment Tribunal and mediation 
According to section 76(c) of the Employment Contracts Act, the object of the 
creation of the Tribunal is to establish a "low level, informal specialist Employment 
Tribunal to provide speedy, fair, and just resolution of differences between parties to 
employment contracts, it being recognized that in some cases mutual resolution is either 
inappropriate or impossible". The Tribunal is also the source for "appropriate services" 
(i.e. mediation) to facilitate mutual resolution by parties to employment contracts of 
differences that arise between them (s.7(b)). 
The Tribunal, then, has both mediatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction. In perfoiining 
its general functions the Tribunal may provide mediation assistance ("in order to facilitate 
agreed settlements of differences between the parties to employment contracts") or 
adjudicate a settlement of differences between those parties (s.78(3)). The rules relating to 
mediation are flexible. The provision of mediation assistance is not confmed to matters 
within the formal jurisdiction of the Tribunal, neither is a founal application for such 
assistance a prerequisite 10 its being provided (s.78(4)). Nor is mediation a prerequisite to 
adjudication (s.78(6)). If an application is made to the Tribunal for adjudication, an 
officer of the Tribunal may determine that the parties be provided with mediation 
assistance before the application is set down for adjudication (s.80(2)) or the Tribunal 
may determine - after the matter has been set down for adjudication - that mediation 
assistance should be provided (s.80(3)}. 
The Department of Labour had identified a "perceived difficulty" with the old system 
as being the "combination of mediation and arbitration roles in a single process" 
(Department of Labour, .1991). The answer, under the Employment Contracts Act is a 
split in functions. Members of the Tribunal may be designated mediator members, 
adjudicator members, or members who are both mediators and adjudicators (s.81(1)). 
However, where the Tribunal is called upon in relation to any particular matter both to 
provide mediation services and to adjudicate, the same member of the Tribunal must not 
perfot 111 both services (s.81 (5)). If nothing more was said, it coUld have been argued that 
the Act had met the central criticism of industrial mediation in New Zealand - that it has 
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always possessed an unsatisfactory "'hybrid" quality of "mediation cum arbitration" 
(Howells and Cathfo., 1986). Yet we read on to learn in section 88(2) of the Act that: 
Where a member of the Tribunal provides mediation services within the 
adjudication jurisdiction of the 'Tribunal, and as a result the parties conclude a 
settlement or agree to the member making a decision, the parties may request 
the mem.ber to sign the tenns of settlement and in any such case those terms of 
settlement shall be fmal and binding on the parties. 
Whilst no exception can be taken to the parties binding themselves to a ·mutually 
agreed settlement, the reference to the mediator "making a decision" immediately 
reinforces the New Zealand stereotype of the mediator as arbitrator, with all of the 
attendant difficulties which such a concept involves (Howells, 1984; Grills, 1985). 'The 
opportunity to separate mediation from arbitration, as is the case in other jurisdictions, 
has thus been lost once again. Option 2, as put into effect, does not fulfil the criterion of 
the "need to differentiate between facilitative and arbitral functions in disputes" 
(Deparunent of Labour, 1991). The reference to the tenus of settlement being "fmal and 
binding" will not, of course, p~eclude judicial review on established grounds., over which 
the Employment Court will have jurisdiction (s.105). 
It remains to be seen how the new system of mediation will evolve, assuming 
outsiders will be allowed to obseiV~e or monitor it the Official Inforrnation Act 1982 does 
not apply to infounation relating to :mediation services (s.l02). It ~can be expected that 
. parties will be directed to mediation fairly fnnaly in many cases, at least at the outset of 
the scheme. A number of factors will contribute to this. There is a large backlog of 
cases yet to be dealt with under the Labour R~elations Act 1987; due to ·the ~extension of 
the right to bring personal grievances and other disputes to all employment contracts, the 
Tribunal faces a possible incr·ease in applications, as compared with grievance and 
disputes committees under the 1987 Act; and there is a lack of any demonstrated 
commitment to boost resources significantly at the adjudication level. Whether parties so 
directed will then agfee to the .mediator deciding the case will, as always, be a question of 
tactics, in which the relevant factors will vary from the personality of the mediator to the 
type of ~case in issue. Some sexual harassment cases, for example, might be seen as 
more appropriately dealt with in the mofe private and infoitnal context provided by 
mediation . Inevitably., for some parties, the temptation to use the mediation hearing as a 
sounding board for obtaining in advance the other party's likely ·evidence and stance in the 
adjudication hearing will prov~e irresistible. 
3. The Emp:loyment Tribunal and adjudication 
Apart from its jurisdiction to provide mediation assistance, the Tribunal has an 
extensive adjudicatory jurisdiction in relation to personal grievances, interpr·etation 
disputes, recovery of wages, penalty actions, compliance orders and actions for breach of 
~employment contracts (s. 79(1)). It has the now familiar jurisdiction to decide such 
matters in "equity and good conscience" (s.79(2)). For the purpose of any hearing, the 
Tribunal will .consist of one member sitting alone (s.81(2)). Despite the heavily 
contractual emphasis of the Act, and the likelihood that many interpretation disputes and 
actions for breach of contract will involve technical contractual points, there is no 
statutory requirement that adjudicators be legally qualified. The recent appointment to the 
Employment Tribunal of 4 lawyers, 3 of whom have active experience in the labour law 
field, perhaps represents some indication that the potential problems are recognized. 
Notwithstanding the purported object of providing an "informal" forum tor the 
settlement of employment disputes (s.76(c)), it is a safe prediction that appearances before 
the Tribunal will be far more fonnal than those before grievance and disputes comminees. 
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In part, this is dictated by the fo1tnal rules as to the appearance of parties (s.90), 
rehearings (s.91), the power to issue witness summons and hear evidence on oath (s.96), 
to prohibit publication of evidence (s.97), to award costs (s.98) and to dismiss frivolous 
cases (s.99). Greater fot1nality will also be necessitated by the new rules relating to 
appeals from the Tribunal to the Court. Under the Employment Contracts Bill, such 
appeals would have been restricted to questions of law. The intention was to get the 
lower body to hear all the issues, avoiding the withholding of evidence at the lower 
hearing as a "tactical ploy", as occasionally occurred under the Labour Court's jurisdiction 
to hear cases de novo (Department of Labour, 1991). The restriction of appeals to 
questions of law was not a logical response to this perceived problem, however, and 
instead the Act adopts an approach previously set out in the Labour Relations Bill 1986 
(but not subsequently enacted). In hearing appeals from the Tribunal, the Court must 
consider only those issues, explanations and facts that were placed before the Tribunal 
unless it is satisfied that other issues, explanations and facts are relevant to the Tribunal's 
decision and either that the party seeking to introduce them could not, by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, have placed them before the Tribunal or that, because of exceptional 
circumstances, it is fair to consider them. The onus of establishing the fottner category 
lies on the party seeking to introduce the new material (s.95(4)). 
It will thus be incumbent on the parties to establish the full facts at the Tribunal 
level, an exercise which traditionally has been felt to demand fottnal examination, cross-
examination and re-examination of wiUlesses. This process, and the technical skills 
associated with supervising it, will require the application of techniques more closely 
akin to court hearings than to the committee hearings under the Labour Relations Act 
1987. This will inevitably increase the length of such hearings as compared with, say, 
those of grievance committees., so that the Tribunal stage may well come to resemble the 
2 to 3 day hearings which were once the usual province of the Labour Court when 
hearing grievances de novo. Nor does the new restriction on appeals seem likely to 
reduce the length of appeal hearings in the Employment Court (as would have occurred 
under the original proposal to confine appeals to questions of law). Even a fairly narrow 
ground of appeal, for example, an appeal against one or other of the remedies awarded, 
may involve extensive reconsideration of evidence. 
Finally, proceedings may be referred or removed to the Employment Court by the 
TribunaL The Tribunal may refer a question of law to the ~Court for its opinion, where 
such a question has arisen in proceedings before it for adjudication (s.93). Any party to 
proceedings before the Tribunal may apply to the Tribunal to hav~e the proceedings, or 
part of them, transferred to the Court for the Court to hear and detettnine on the grounds 
either that an important question of law is likely to arise in the matter other than 
incidentally or that the case is of such a nature and of such urgency that it is in the public 
interest that it be removed immediately to the Court. Leave of the Court may be sought 
to remove such a case to the Court where the Tribunal declines to so remove it (s.94). 
4. The jurisdiction of the Employment C~ourt 
The jurisdiction and powers of the Employment Court, set out in section 104 of the 
Act, are extensive. For present purposes they may be divided into 4 parts. First, there is 
the Court's appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in relation to the Tribunal, discussed 
above. Second, the Employment Court retains the Labour Court's familiar jurisdiction 
over compliance orders and review proceedings, although each of these is modified under 
the Act, as well as tort actions and injunctions arising from strikes and lockouts. Third, 
the Court has general jurisdiction to hear and determine any action founded on an 
employment contract and to make any order in such proceedings that the High Coun or 
the District Court may make under any enactment or rule of law relating to contracts. 
This power is subject to a significant restriction on the Court's ability to grant such 
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orders, discussed presently. Fourth, the Coun has its much heralded new jurisdiction over 
"harsh and oppressive" contracts. I intend to concenttate on these last 2 aspects of the 
Coun's jurisdiction in what follows. 
Jurisdiction ov,er employment contracts 
The most significant addition to the Court's jwisdiction, as compared with that of 
the Labour Court, will be the cases based upon an alleged breach of the individual 
common law contract of employment. ~Of these cases, actions based upon breach of 
restraint clauses and breaches of the implied tetan as to fidelity and the duty not to 
disclose confidential info1naation would appear to be the most significant numerically in 
New Zealand over recent years (Brown and Grant, 1989).. It can confidently be anticipated 
that circumstances which might hav,e given rise to actions for wrongful dismissal will 
now be subsumed under the more generous principles relating to unjustifiable dismissal, 
which is not hampered by the restriction on damages arising from the Addis rule (Law 
Commission, 1991) or the reluctance of the commo&t law courts to reinstate dismissed 
workers. 
At this point some significant jurisdictional questions arise. 'The Employment 
Tribunal, as we have seen, has general jurisdiction to adjudicate on all actions for breach 
of an employment contract. Each of the examples cited abov~e would fall within that 
category. Howev,er, the Tribunal is not given the wider powers conferred on the Court to 
make orders that may be made by the High ~Court or a District Court under the general 
law relating to contracts. Its jurisdiction would therefore seem to be confined in such 
cases to awarding a penalty for breach (s . 52) or a compliance order (s.55). Conversely, 
t.he Employment ,Court, whilst possessing the jurisdiction to make orders in such cases 
under 'the general law of contracts, possesses no original jurisdiction to enforce the 
contract by means of a compliance order (although it may hear appeals fro.m non-
compliance with orders made by the Employment Tribunal).. The Court's original 
jurisdiction to Ofder compliance is restricted to ordering compliance with any provision of 
Part I and Part V of the Act (dealing with "Freedom of Association" and strikes and 
lockouts respectively), or its own orders and directions (s.56). 
The resulting jurisdictional problems can be illustrated by a typical action to enfolice 
a restraint clause and non-disclosure of confidential information. Smith Ltd have 
contracted with their ~employee Brown that Brown will not work for a rival company in 
the same town for a period of one year after leaving Smith's employment. Brown leaves 
Smith Ltd and immediately begins to work with Jones Ltd, a dir~ect rival in the same 
town. Smith Ltd wish to sue Brown to enforce the restraint clause and to prevent 
disclosure of confidential infonnation acquired during the course of her ,employment. 
Under the regime which preceded the Employmen:t Contracts Act 1991, such actions 
would have been brought in the High Court, with the usual remedies claimed by Smith 
Ltd against Brown being an injunction and damages. The High Court also possessed 
power to modify the restraint clause under section 8 of the Illegal Contracts Act 1970 so 
as to make it reasonable. Jurisdiction ov~er each of these remedies in the context of an 
employment contract is now expressly conferred on the Employment Coun under section 
104(I)(g)(h) of the Employment Contracts Act. 'There is no corresponding mention of 
such powers in section 79 of the Act, which ~establishes the Tribunal's jurisdiction. By 
plain inference, adopting well-established rules of statutory interpretation, the 
Employment Tribunal was not intended to possess those particular powers. It appears., 
then, that Smith Ltd will have to go directly Lo the Court in order to obtain the 
established remedies of injunction and damages. But supposing (as will usually be the 
case) that the company's main aim is to prevent the ex-employee from working with a 
competitor, damages being either of secondary importance or of no importance at all? In 
such a case, an application to the Tribunal for a compliance o~der might possess distinct 
I 
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advantages for the company over the injunction process, in te1n1s of issues such as 
standing, the "threshold requirements" and onus of proof (Hughes, 1989, ch.9). 
Thus, at this initial stage, Smith Ltd might be able to enforce the restraint as it 
stands without modification. Only on appeal to the Employment Court, would the 
Court's general jurisdiction allow it to apply the Illegal Contracts Act 1970. Given the 
well-recognized use of widely-drafted restraint clauses to deter ex-employees from entering 
into activities which might be perfectly lawful, the consequent delay in consideration of 
the k~ey issue from the ex-employee's point of view (namely the reasonableness of the 
restraint) seems unfortunate, to say the least. Compliance orders are, of course, 
discretionary and it may be that the Tribunal would take such issues in~o account in 
deciding whether to make the order. 
The remaining issue- the prevention of disclosure of confidential infonnation- raises 
a question as to the scope of the Tribunal's power to order compliance which is likely to 
arise in other contexts. In contrast to the Labour Court's power to order compliance 
under the Labour Relations Act 1987, under section 55 of the Act the ·Tribunal is 
empowered to order compliance with - amongst other things - "Any provision of ... Any 
employment contract". Since there is no requirement in the Act that individual contracts 
be in writing, it would arguably be unduly restrictive to confine the word "provision" to 
its usual legal context of a stipulation incorporated in a written document, although the 
the idea conveyed by the word "provision" is clearly narrower than the concept of 
... conditions" of employment which appears in section 28 of the Act. But is the word 
"provision" restricted here to agreed terms in the oral or written employment contract 
(thereby excluding implied terms, such as the duty not to disclose confidences) or is it 
wide enough to embrace implied terms? It might be that, even reading the word 
"provision" at its widest, as covering any requirement in a contract, the Employment 
Tribunal and the Employment Court would be reluctant to read the word "provision"' so 
widely as to cover implied terms, although a number of the terms implied by law (such 
as the troubled concept of a "right to work") have been given tacit approval by the Court 
of Appeal and await a detailed indigenous stamp. If the parties to an employment 
contract are held able to use the compliance jurisdiction to enforce implied ter nts in the 
contract, the relevant jurisprudence will not be long in the making. 
There remains the problem of jurisdiction (noted above) if, in the hypothetical, 
Brown has, say, physically removed information belonging to Smith Ltd on her 
departure, sabotaged her company car on being told to return it, or breached a fiduciary 
duty owed to Smith Ltd in her contractual capacity as an employee. There is "no 
difference, except of degree, between breaches of fiduciary and of other obligations 
imposed by contract" .1 
The Employment Court's restricted jurisdiction 
We have seen that the Employment Court has inherited the jurisdiction to make any 
order that may be made by the High Court or a District Court in relation to contracts. 
This power is subject to a significant limitation. Under section 104(2) of the Act, where 
the Court thereby has the power to make an order cancelling or varying any contract or 
any term of any contract "it shall ... make such an order only if satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that such an order should be made and that any other remedy would be 
inappropriate or inadequate". Whilst the statutory drafting is loose, it seems that the 
intention is that the "reasonable doubt" qualification should apply only where the Court 
is faced with a choice between variation or cancellation on the one hand and some other 
remedy (for example, damages) on the other. In some cases, of course, the Court might 
well wish to grant some other remedy as well as ordering either variation or cancellation. 
1 Chief Judge Goddard in Airline Pilots Association v Air NZ Ltd (1991). 
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The reason for this restriction is not immediately apparent. I am unaware of any 
statutory counterpart in re'lation to other courts. In purely legal terms, applying the 
criminal standard of proof of facts to a judge's assessment of the appropriate remedy in 
civil cases seems little short of bizarre. However, confining the Court's jurisdiction 
closely is entirely consistent with the persistent campaign of criticism waged against the 
Labour Court in areas such as its decisions on redundancy by the Employers' Federation, 
the Business Roundtable and the current Minister of Labour whilst in opposition. 
The jurisdiction thus curtailed by the Act might arise in a number of cases. Section 
8 of the llJegal Contracts Act 1970, enables the Court to cancel or modify contractual 
tei nas which afe in restraint of trade. Section 43 of the Fair Trading Act 1'986 enables the 
Court to declare void, or vary, contracts which contravene Parts I to IV of that Act. 
Section 12 of the Fair Trading Act might assum~e particular relevance in the new 
bargaining regime. That section prohibits anyone (for practical purposes, employers and 
employment agencies) from engaging in conduct that is misleading or dec,eptive, or is 
likely to mislead or deceive., in relation to employment that is, or is to be offered, 
concerning the availability., natur~e, tenns and conditions, or any other matter relating to 
that employment. Whilst few workers e.mployed under an individual employment 
contract would seek cancellation under the Fair Trading Act, there may well be occasions 
on which the canoellation of a collective employment contract arising from misleading 
conduct could prove advantageous. Whilst little attention has been paid to this provision 
in New Zealand, the cotiesponding (and identical) Australian provision has attracted rather 
mor~e litigation (Hughes, 1989}. The remaining avenues ~or ,cancellation or modification 
are likely to be of slight significance in the employment ,context. The Minors Contrncts 
Act 1969 enabl~es the ,Court to cancel (but not to modify or vary) unconscionable or 
111harsh or oppressive" contracts of service. Notwithstanding the absence of a minimum 
wage for workers under the age of 20, this power is unli.k~ely to be of any practical use to 
young workers. Finally., section 7 of the Contractual Mistakes .Act 1977 ,enables the 
Court to cancel or vary contracts which have been entered into under mistake: plainly, 
this is a situation that is unlikely to arise in practice in the context of ~employment. 
~Over.all, then, the emphasis is on restricting the Court's ability to intervene in the 
employment relationship to ensure a minimal lev,el of fairness. This emphasis is 
heightened by the removal of reinstatement as the primary re:m,edy for unjustifiable 
dismissal (s.26) and removing from the ambit of the law of illegal contracts any bfeach of 
the bargaining provisions in Part II of the Act (s.25). N·owhere is it more obvious than 
in the provisions of section 57 of the Act, which can now be examined. 
"'Harsh and oppress.ive" contracts 
Section 57(1) of the 1991 Act states that ·where any party to an employm~ent contract 
alleges-
(a) That the employment contract, or any part of it, was procured by harsh and 
oppressiv,e behaviour or by undue influence or by dur,ess; or 
(b) 'That the employ.ment contract, or any part of it, was harsh and oppressiv,e 
when it was entered into,-
that party may apply to the Court for an order setting aside the contract or directing any 
party to the contract to pay such sum by way of compensation as the Court thinks :fit. It 
is noteworthy that the remedy likely to be of most use to an exploited worker - that of 
variation of the offending te1 u1 or tet Jus - is not ~expressly available to the Court In the 
absence of an express pow,er to this effect, it seems doubtful 'Whether the Court's power to 
make an order "on such terrns and conditions as it thinks fit"' (s.57(6)) could be used to 
this effect 
.. 
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The sting in the tail of this allegedly "protective" p~<>vision is contained in 
subsection 7. Under that subsection, except as pfovided in section 57 (that is, the 
grounds set out above) "the Court shall have no jurisdiction to set aside or modify, or 
grant relief in respect of, any employment contract under the law relating to unfair or 
unconscionable bargains". The law thus excluded is a body of common law Gudge-made) 
principles which considers contractual enforcement in te1ans of bargaining power. The 
ordinary courts have developed a doctrine of unfairness- or "unconscionability"- relating 
to issues such as relative bargaining power, "one-sided" contracts, unfair standard fonn 
contracts and lack of independent advice, all subsumed under the general question whether 
the stronger party to a contract has taken advantage of the w,eaker (Burrows, 1991). 
Legislative embodiment of these principles in the fotan of an "unfair contracts" statute 
was under active consideration at the time the Employment Contracts Bill was introduced 
(Law Commission, 1990). Whilst the common law principles had not been applied to 
employment contracts under the more regulated conditions provided by the Labour 
Relations Act 1987, they were clearly ripe for application to the minimalist bargaining 
regime introduced by the 1991 Act which, taken in conjunction with the benefit cuts 
under the Social Security Amendment Act 1991, could scarcely have provided a more 
fertile environment for the exploitation of vulnerable workers. Nevertheless, at the very 
time when they were arguably of most practical relevance., the Employment Court has 
been precluded from applying them except to the ~extent that they fall under the rubric 
"harsh and oppressive". What does this phrase mean in the context of section 57? 
As noted earlier, subsection 7 states that ",except as provided in [s.57]" the 
Employment Court may not ~employ the law relating to unfair or unconscionable 
bargains. Presumably one can derive from this wording the proposition that section 57 is 
intended generally to narrow the ambit of the Court's inquiry as compared with the 
approach that might have been taken under the general law relating to unconscionability. 
It would probably not be open to the Employment Court to adopt the approach of 
Australian industrial courts and to hold that the word "harsh" can be read as a synonym 
for "unfair" or "unconscionable" .2 This throws us back on an examination of the phrase 
"harsh and oppressive", an examination that is not helped by contrasting assumptions in 
the Credit Contracts Act 1981 that "oppressive", "harsh"' and "unconscionable~~ are 
synonyms (s.9 of the Act, defining "oppressive") and in the Minors Contracts Act 1980 
that the words "harsh" and "oppressive" have different meanings (s.5 of the Act employs 
the formula "harsh or oppressive"). 
Semantically, the phrase "harsh and oppressive" might be seen to embrace a contract, 
or term, which is unjustly burdensome to the point of being cruel or repugnanl In an 
area where judicial instinct on a case-by-case basis is likely to count for more than a 
purely semantic inquiry, it may be that the matter cannot be pursued further with any 
profit. Judicial interpretation of the phrase "harsh and oppressive" seems so far to have 
been confined to matrimonial legislation where - so far as seems relevant in the present 
context - the Australian courts have held that each of the words in the phrase must be 
given its meaning, that the phrase as a whole connotes some "substantial detrim~ent" and 
that the interpretation issue is not satisfied by arguments based on generalities or social 
philosophy (M cDona/d v M cDona/d, 1965). 
The area in which any meaningful "unconscionability" jurisdiction was most likely 
to be of practical use- that of economic exploitation- is thus considerably undercut. Not 
only is the Court's power restricted but in other steps the Government has established a 
floor of minimum standards which the Cowt will be unable to ignore. These include the 
new provision for a non-transferable 5 days annual paid sick leave and the controversial 
announcement by the Minister of Social Welfare that- for those under the age of 20- the 
2 Re Loty (1971) construing the phrase "harsh, unjust or unreasonable"' in the ~con:text of 
reinstatement. 
• 
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weekly unemployment benefit rate for a young person, plus $15, is the cut-off point for 
reasonably declining work 
The remaining concepts in section 57 - the use of "undue influence" and "duress" are 
more settled. "Undue influence" bears the connotation of excessive or disproportionate 
press~e by which a person is induced not 10 act of their own free will (Engineers Union 
v Hoyne, 1988). Duress entails illegitimaLe coercion of the will so as to vitiate consent 
(Burrows, 1991), thereby opening the way for employers (who given overseas examples, 
are likely to be the exclusive users of this power) to use this as an avenue for reversing 
the outcome of negotiations where a settlement is achieved, say, by unlawful strike 
action. That this sweeping new statutory addition to the employers' arsenal should find 
its way into a section wrongly heralded as providing significant new protections for 
employees seems entirely appropriate 10 the general thrust of the 1991 Act. 
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